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At the core of President Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign was the notion of hope. I remember Hilary Clinton mocking the then Senator Obama about his lofty ideas of hope, saying, “I could stand up here and say, Let's just get everybody together, let's get unified, the sky will open, the light will come down, celestial choirs will be singing, and everyone will know we should do the right thing and the world will be perfect” (reference).
Interestingly enough, Hillary Clinton made a rather profound point by stating, “…and everyone will know we should do the right thing.” What is the right thing for a war on the other side of the globe? Do we really feel that Palestinian security forces maybe jeopardized? That they maybe compromised by the Taliban? Are we really in fear of further destabilizing the Middle East by extracting troops from the region?
The vast majority of us will never have access to the substantive intelligence necessary to make an informed decision on the war in Afghanistan. So all the pundits and radio host, all the TV stations and bloggers proclaiming the “TRUTH ABOUT THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN” are nothing more than cogs in the marketing machine, because there is no truth about the war in Afghanistan.
This semester I’m teaching a graduate seminar called International War at Nova Southeastern University and we review various strategies to war, the implications of war, and just war theory. In reviewing the literature, and discussing the current events in American warfare, it dawned on me that since the Vietnam war, American presidents have been playing from the same playbook, year after year after year.
Imagine that you are a football coach and you know that your opponents study your plays after each game by meticulously reviewing the game footage. You would like to ensure that they wouldn’t be able to use this knowledge against you in future games by alternating your playbooks. You would have multiple approaches to executing effective plays. Hopefully, then, this would secure the future success of the team.
Since the Vietnam war, and arguably even before that, the American government has been running plays out of the same playbook and our enemies have know this for decades. Most concisely stated, incrementalism is an approach to the politics of war, which is based on analyzing the success and failures of policies most relevant to the nature of the war at hand. Given the current level of intelligence combined with the most precise data, expected casualties and so forth a decision is made on the level of engagement.
I’m no bureaucrat but I’d say we’re precisely at this point in the game. If it is true, and I think it is, that the U.S. government is taking an incrementalist approach to the war in Afghanistan, and our enemies know that that’s what we always do, shouldn’t we change the game? What, then, is the game? The game is to shape public opinion around an already predetermined level of military engagement.
For example, in a section titled, “Preparing Public Statements Based on Intelligence” it is stated,
“This use of intelligence has been a source of considerable debate. Speeches given
by senior Administration leaders did not describe in detail the disparate sources or the
complex analytical reasoning that lay behind the intelligence judgments that were cited.
Some observers believe that intelligence was simplified to the point of distortion in order
to shape the public debate. A former National Intelligence Officer, Paul Pillar, argues that
the “Administration used intelligence not to inform decision-making, but to justify a
decision already made.” He further criticizes the Administration for “aggressively using
intelligence to win public support for its decision to go to war.”
The idea of “containing” the trouble makers is an oversimplified means of describing what we do as Americans, but during the Clinton era, President Bill Clinton attempted the “dual containment” of Iran and Iraq. (reference). Now, if I were a betting man, and I’m not, I’d put all my chips in and bet that President Obama’s military advisors, using the same old playbook, based on an incrementalist approach to warfare are still talking about containment.
So, not only are we trying to “contain Iran” from seeking nuclear capabilities, we are trying to “contain” the war in Iraq and now, I guarantee, it is being suggested that we should “contain Afghanistan” But what the hell does that mean? I sure don’t know. What I do know is that the more those with power try to “contain” those without power, especially those without power living on relatively the same latitudinal line, the more likely those without power are to mobilize their forces and resist containment.
The enemy is expecting to hear us talk about containment. They are eagerly waiting for us to invoke the burden of having to contain them from the rest of us. It’s like the quarantine scene in any apocalyptic movie where those infected have to be kept from stepping out of bounds.
The HUGE problem with this strategy, even as a means of preventing war is that it (1) disassociates their interest from ours (2) it actually reinforces and facilitates anti-West sentiments (3) it make gathering intelligence all the more difficult because outsiders are so easily recognized (4) it forces those with power to arbitrarily justify their “duty” to enforce rules of containment through the restriction of travel, the restriction of trade, the restriction of informational exchange and so on.
In short, it’s the same old playbook and the same plays are being called. Our enemies know this and are unifying around a common enemy. We do not have the right to “contain” and if we begin to use this language of containment we better explain exactly what it is that’s being contained.
I hope that Obama’s discourse on hope wasn’t just another exercise in delivering a great speech, as Clinton may have said during the primaries. I hope he has hope for the Middle East. I hope that he won’t make the same errors of his predecessors by invoking the notion of containment and a protectionist stance. I hope that he’ll initiate diplomatic relations with Hamid Karzai and seriously consider his need to protect his people. I hope that if we do go to war in Afghanistan we’ll take serious note of the protest to the use of UAVs in minimizing civilian casualties. All of these things have already been said, but now is not the time for speaking. Now it’s time for action, but how that action will unfold is yet to be seen.

 
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